主 题：On the Values of Information Sharing and Cooperative Price Setting Between Competing Firms
主讲人：姜立
主持人：张红历
时 间：2014年6月13日（周五） 14：00-15：30
地 点：通博楼B212学术会议室
主办单位：统计学院 科研处
主讲人简介：
姜立，2007年毕业于美国密西根大学ROSS商学院，现任香港理工大学物流与航运学系助理教授，MBA中心主任。研究方向为运营管理、供应链管理、多渠道网络设计等。研究论文发表Management Science, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Operations Research, and Production and Operations Management等国际A级期刊上，同时也担任上述期刊的审稿人。
内容提要：
We consider a setting of two firms that produce and sell substitutable products under Bertrand-type price competition. Given the increasingly volatile market condition, the access to and sharing of information have particular strategic values to firms. The deployment of information systems grants them each an exclusive access to some demand signal. We show that private signals enable firms to improve forecast and earn higher profits. Provided that their private signals are not perfectly correlated, firms can benefit from sharing signals with each other, irrespective of product substitutability. In the existing literature, horizontal information sharing has been generally shown to be unsustainable, particularly when products are perfect substitutes. Our results indicate the role of market competition mode in the sustainability of information sharing. Moreover, we show that information sharing is a strategic complement to cooperative price setting to improve the firms’ profit performance.
