主讲人： Fei Song（瑞尔森大学，副教授）主持人：周铭山（西南财经大学金融学院，副院长、副教授）
时 间：2014年6月6日（周五）下午15：30-17：00
地 点：柳林校区颐德楼H305
主办单位：大金融学术研究沙龙、金融学院、科研处
主讲人简介：
Dr. Fei Song is an Associate Professor of HRM/OB in the Ted Rogers School of Management, Ryerson University. Dr. Song is trained in the field of Organizational Behaviour. Theories and methodologies from social psychology and experimental/behavioural economics have significantly influenced her research. Her research interests include 1) behavioural decision-making, e.g. cooperation and competition, trust and reciprocity, fairness, group decision-making, cross-cultural issues, and 2) strategic compensation and productivity. She has been awarded many research grants and awards, and has published widely in top management and social science journals such as the Academy of Management Journal, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Management and Organization Review, Game and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Conflict Management, Experimental Economics, and Journal of Economic Psychology. She teaches in the areas of organizational behavior, cross-cultural and global management, strategic thinking and negotiation, strategic compensation, and research methods.
沙龙论文摘要：
We experimentally investigate a new variant of the trust/investment game that captures the key features of internet peer-to-peer (P2P) lending: the borrower specifies the amount of money required and makes a contingent promise about the value of the generally higher repayment prior to the investor’s decision to lend the required sum or not. We examine the role played by two factors related to traditional Chinese culture and ethics: whether (i) an ex-ante existing social relationship between the actors (guanxi or relationship) and (ii) the ability of the actors to observe each other’s identity after the repayment decision (mianzi or face) affect the borrowers’ decisions to make the promised repayments and ultimately the consequent aggregate realized social benefits. Using a two-by-two factorial design, we conduct four treatments in China where these factors are hypothesized to be especially salient, and also perform the mianzi treatment in New Zealand as a cultural control. We find that in China both guanxi and mianzi are positively and significantly related to the probability of a repayment promise being kept. Moreover, these two factors are substitutes for each other. In New Zealand, there was no significant mianzi effect on promise keeping. The effectiveness of mianzi in China but not in New Zealand resulted in a significantly higher proportion of promises being kept when agents were identifiable in China than in New Zealand. Over time, guanxi and mianzi led investors in China to accept more proposals, resulting in more investment and the creation of greater social surplus.
