（一）
主讲人：美国肯塔基大学Hong Xie教授
主 题：A Review of Research on Earnings Management
地 点：通博楼D207会议室
主持人：会计学院 谭洪涛教授
时 间：2013年7月5日（星期五）上午9:00
主 办：会计学院 科研处
（二）
主讲人：美国肯塔基大学Hong Xie 教授
主 题：Negative Press Coverage, Litigation Risk, and Audit Opinions in China
地 点：通博楼D207会议室
主持人：会计学院 谭洪涛教授
时 间：2013年7月5日（星期五）下午2:00
主 办：会计学院 科研处
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主讲人介绍：
谢宏，现任美国肯塔基大学Gatton商学院会计学系副教授。1983年毕业于上海交通大学，1986年获得英属哥伦比亚大学MBA学位，1998年荣获美国爱荷华大学博士学位，2008年成为雪城大学惠特曼管理学院的鲁宾学者。谢宏教授多年来致力于会计专业领域研究，参与国际顶级学术会议达10余次，在《The Accounting Review》、《Contemporary Accounting Research》国外权威学术期刊中发表论文多篇，并担任《Accounting Review》、《Review of Accounting Studies》、《Contemporary Accounting Research》、《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》、《Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory》等国际一流学术期刊的特约评论员。
报告内容介绍：
1.A review of research on earnings management, with a particular emphasis on discontinuities in earnings distribution as evidence of earnings management.
2.Negative Press Coverage, Litigation Risk, and Audit Opinions in China
Exploiting a legal regime change in China in 2005 that significantly increased auditors’ civil liability, we reexamine why auditors are more likely to issue modified audit opinions (MAOs) to clients who receive negative press coverage before audit report dates. We find that negative press coverage prior to the audit report date significantly increases the probability for auditors to issue MAOs during 2001-2009, consistent with findings using the US data. More importantly, we find that such a positive relation does not exist in the low litigation risk period (2001-2004) and that it exists only in the high litigation risk period (2006-2009). Moreover, accounting-related negative press coverage and non-accounting-related negative press coverage affect audit opinions in the same way with neither (both) affecting (increasing) the probability of MAOs in the low (high) litigation risk period. Furthermore, first-reported negative press coverage and repeated negative press coverage affects audit opinions differently. While neither affects the probability of MAOs in the low litigation risk period, only first-report negative press coverage increases the probability of MAOs in the high litigation risk period. Finally, supplementary analyses based on audit fees and regulatory sanctions confirm an increase in litigation risk subsequent to negative press coverage in the high litigation risk period. Taken together, our findings suggest that auditors increase the probability of issuing MAOs in response to negative press coverage in order to mitigate litigation risk.
