主讲人：Nicholas Feltovich (Professor in Monash University)
主 题：How Responsive are people to changes in their bargaining position? Earned bargaining power and the 50-50 norm
主持人：梁平汉 经济与管理学院 副教授
时 间：6月28日上午10:00——11:30
地 点：通博楼C216（财税学院会议室）
主办单位：实验经济学实验室 财税学院 科研处
摘要：
Previous research has shown that individuals do not respond to changes in their bargaining position to the extent predicted by standard bargaining theories. Most of these results have come from experiments with bargaining power allocated exogenously, so that individuals may perceive it as having been "unearned" and thus be reluctant to exploit it. Also, equal splits of the "cake" (the amount bargained over) have typically been equilibrium outcomes, leading to a powerful tendency toward 50-50 splits. We conduct a bargaining experiment in which subjects earn their bargaining power through a real-effort task. Treatments are based on the Nash demand game (NDG) and a related unstructured bargaining game (UBG). Subjects bargain over a fixed amount of money, with disagreement payments determined entirely by the number of units of the real-effort task successfully completed. Task parameters are set to allow disagreement payoffs above half the cake size, in which case 50-50 splits are not individually rational, and thus not consistent with equilibrium.
We find that subjects are least responsive to changes in own and opponent disagreement payoffs in the NDG with both disagreement payments below half the cake size. Responsiveness is higher in the UBG, and in the NDG when one disagreement payment is more than half the cake size, but in both cases it is still less than predicted. It is only in the UBG when a disagreement payment is more than half the cake size that responsiveness to disagreement payoffs reaches the predicted level. Our results imply that even when real-life bargaining position is determined by past behaviour rather than luck, the extent to which actual bargaining corresponds to theoretical predictions will depend on (1) the institutions within which bargaining takes place, and (2) the distribution of bargaining power; in particular, whether the 50-50 norm yields a viable outcome.
主讲人简介：
Nicholas Feltovich是国际著名的实验经济学家，现任澳大利亚莫纳什大学经济系教授。他于1997年于美国匹兹堡大学获得博士学位，师从2012年诺贝尔经济学奖得主Alvin Roth，此后他曾经任教于University of Houston, University of Aberdeen等。他的主要研究领域包括实验经济学、博弈论、行为经济学、产业组织等，其论文曾经发表在Econometrica, RAND Journal of Economics, International Economic Review, Journal of Public Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Experimental Economics, Economic Inquiry, European Economic Review等国际一流学术期刊上。他还是Journal of Socio-Economics和European Economic Review的Associate Editor。
