Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 张俊森教授 (经济学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261926 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/6WOS source URL
其它资讯
摘要Bequest to and marriage of children can lead to a Pareto-inefficient allocation. The inefficiency (or market failure) arises because one family, making a bequest to its own child, ignores the contribution to the utility of the other family whose child enters the marriage. This note shows that an assortative mating rule based on bequests can improve or even restore Pareto efficiency when parents take account of the rule in deciding the amount of bequests to their own children.
着者ZHANG J
期刊名称Journal of Political Economy
出版年份1994
月份2
日期1
卷号102
期次1
出版社UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
页次187 - 193
国际标準期刊号0022-3808
语言英式英语
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Economics; ECONOMICS
