Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 李宏彬教授 (经济学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.08.001 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/28WOS source URL
其它资讯
摘要This paper studies insider privatization in rural China and provides an explanation of why some firms have performed well after privatization but others have not. We show theoretically that the underperformance of insider-privatized firms could be due to the manager-cum-owner's lack of incentives after privatization. A screening theory predicts that the buyout price is correlated with the postprivatization incentives, and a firm's postprivatization performance increases with both the buyout price and postprivatization incentives. Drawing on data we collected in China, we find evidence supporting the theory. We also find that the buyout price decreases with the degree of information asymmetry. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
着者Li HB, Rozelle S
期刊名称Journal of Development Economics
出版年份2004
月份10
日期1
卷号75
期次1
出版社ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
页次1 - 26
国际标準期刊号0304-3878
电子国际标準期刊号1872-6089
语言英式英语
关键词China; insider; privatization screening contracting
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Economics; ECONOMICS
