Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 杜巨澜教授 (经济学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00403.x |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/31WOS source URL
其它资讯
摘要This paper studies the relationship between corporate leverage and the ultimate corporate ownership structure, particularly the separation of cash flow rights and control rights. We empirically disentangle the three potential effects of the divergence of control rights from cash flow rights on corporate leverage, i.e. the non-dilution entrenchment effect, the signalling effect of debt and the reduce-debt-for-tunnelling effect. Our evidence from the East Asian corporations mainly supports the notion that controlling shareholders with relatively small ownership share tend to increase leverage out of the motive of raising external finance without diluting their shareholding dominance. The separation of cash flow rights and control rights contributes to the risk-taking tendency of the large controlling shareholders in capital structure choice. We argue that the risky capital structure choice serves as one potential channel through which weak corporate governance contributes to the severity of corporate value losses during the Asian financial crisis.
着者Du JL, Dai Y
会议名称International Conference on Subject of Comparisons of Corportate Governance China and United Kingtom
会议开始日10.12.2003
会议完结日11.12.2003
会议地点Cambridge
期刊名称Corporate Governance
出版年份2005
月份1
日期1
卷号13
期次1
出版社BLACKWELL PUBL LTD
页次60 - 71
国际标準期刊号0964-8410
电子国际标準期刊号1467-8683
语言英式英语
关键词capital structure; separation of cash flow rights and control rights; ultimate ownership structure
Web of Science 学科类别Business; BUSINESS; Business & Economics; Business, Finance; BUSINESS, FINANCE; Management; MANAGEMENT
