Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 李多哲教授 (经济学系) |
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Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0WOS source URL
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摘要In a modified version of Rubinstein's bargaining game, two players expect the random arrival of a third party, from whom one of them will receive an interim disagreement payoff in every period until an agreement is finally reached. Each player thinks that his own probability of receiving the disagreement payoff is greater than that assessed by the other player; that is, they are mutually optimistic. We show that when the level of optimism is high and not very durable, equilibrium agreement is delayed until the uncertainty is fully resolved. The efficiency loss caused by such a delay remains substantial when the players are extremely patient.
着者Li DZ, Wong YF
期刊名称B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
出版年份2http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/0http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/09
月份1
日期1
卷号9
期次1
出版社De Gruyter
国际标準期刊号1935-17http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/04
语言英式英语
关键词bargaining; delay; efficiency loss; optimism
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Economics; ECONOMICS
