Publication in refereed journal
香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
| 梁志明博士 (经济学系) |
全文
| 数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10198-009-0158-1 |
引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1WOS source URL
其它资讯
摘要The consequences of consumer-driven health care under different health insurance plans are studied by means of a game theoretic approach. Suitable demand-side cost-sharing can induce consumer behavior that avoids over-treatment when there are information asymmetries between providers and consumers, leading to the efficient recommendations and provision of treatment by providers. If under-treatment can be penalized, then a full insurance model that pays providers a fixed salary and fee-for-service or one that requires patients to present a referral letter before specialist care is delivered also achieves provision efficiency. The two models, however, yield higher welfare for consumers. Hence, the findings in this paper favor some amount of regulation in health-care markets.
着者Leung MCM
期刊名称EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS
出版年份20http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/10
月份4
日期http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1
卷号http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1
期次2
出版社Springer Verlag (Germany)
页次http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/16http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/1 - http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/175
国际标準期刊号http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/16http://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/18-7598
语言英式英语
关键词Asymmetric information; Health insurance; Primary care; Provision efficiency
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Economics; ECONOMICS; Health Care Sciences & Services; Health Policy & Services; HEALTH POLICY & SERVICES
