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Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings (2002)_香港中文大学

香港中文大学 辅仁网/2017-06-24

Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings
Publication in refereed journal


香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)
郎咸平教授 (金融学系)


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引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/827WOS source URL

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摘要This article disentangles the incentive and entrenchment effects of large ownership. Using data for 1,301 publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian economies, we find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership, consistent with an entrenchment effect. Given that concentrated corporate ownership is predominant in most countries, these findings have relevance for corporate governance across the world.

着者Claessens S, Djankov S, Fan JPH, Lang LHP
期刊名称JOURNAL OF FINANCE
出版年份2002
月份12
日期1
卷号57
期次6
出版社WILEY-BLACKWELL
页次2741 - 2771
国际标準期刊号0022-1082
电子国际标準期刊号1540-6261
语言英式英语

Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Business, Finance; BUSINESS, FINANCE; Economics; ECONOMICS

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