ASSET SALES, FIRM PERFORMANCE, AND THE AGENCY COSTS OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION
Publication in refereed journal


香港中文大学研究人员 ( 现职)

郎咸平教授 (金融学系)

全文

数位物件识别号 (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(94)00791-X

引用次数
Web of Sciencehttp://aims.cuhk.edu.hk/converis/portal/Publication/142WOS source URL

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摘要We argue that management sells assets when doing so provides the cheapest funds to pursue its objectives rather than for operating efficiency reasons alone. This hypothesis suggests that (1) firms selling assets have high leverage and/or poor performance, (2) a successful asset sale is good news, and (3) the stock market discounts asset sale proceeds retained by the selling firm. In support of this hypothesis, we find that the typical firm in our sample performs poorly before the sale and that the average stock-price reaction to asset sales is positive only when the proceeds are paid out.

着者LANG L, POULSEN A, STULZ R
期刊名称Journal of Financial Economics
出版年份1995
月份1
日期1
卷号37
期次1
出版社ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA LAUSANNE
页次3 - 37
国际标準期刊号0304-405X
语言英式英语

关键词ASSET SALES
Web of Science 学科类别Business & Economics; Business, Finance; BUSINESS, FINANCE; Economics; ECONOMICS