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翻译训练[E1]

Professional worriers worry about the prominence of the political extremes in France – and it's hard not worry when their parties take a third of the vote – but that vote wasn't quite as large, or as big a deal, as it might seem. In the first round, Marine Le Pen, of the far-right National Front, won eighteen per cent, an all-time high for the Party, but her father, Jean-Marine, won seventeen per cent ten years ago, during a time of much less economic uncertainty. The far left, in the person of the tetchy Jean-Luc Mélenchon, won eleven percent, but it didn't do nearly as well as the unrepentantly pro-Soviet Communist Party used to in the prosperous decades of the nineteen-fifties and sixties, when it dominated the French left. It's the persistence of the extremes, not their supposed gains, that is depressing: between Le Pen's program, which suggested a dark politics that last seemed plausible in June, 1940, and Mélenchon's, which recapitulated the brightest ideas of the autumn of 1917, it seemed that France had become less like the last Gaullist village holding out against the old Roman Empire, or the new American one, than like a theme park of awful ideas.

Far more significant than the rise of the "institutional extremes" is the absence of eloquent leadership at the center. The Socialist Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who not long ago seemed to incarnate the best of the rational middle, celebrated the electoral season by being detained for engaging in orgies with prostitutes. ([3]He claims not to have been aware that that's what the women were.) The former I.M.F. chief's continuing fall brings to mind Michel Houellebecq's gloomy, obsessive novel of more than a decade ago, "The Elementary Particles," with its insistence that the neo-liberal model of material acquisitiveness would lead in the end only to nihilistic sexual compulsion. At the time, Houellebecq seemed pettish; he now seems poetically prescient. [Excerpt from *The Talk of the Town, Vive la France*, 7th May, 2012]

八百万回民都是历史上进入中国的伊斯兰教徒的后裔——从唐到元，西亚、北非、中亚的信仰伊斯兰教的商人、工匠、军人，曾经持续地自愿或被迫进入中国。有的是举族迁来，有的是组成商队——广州港和泉州港正是因为他们与中国的这种商业与移民的关系，而成为中世纪世界上最大的港口。珠江因阿拉伯珠宝商人船沉珠散，江水吞下了珍珠而得名。

云南因元朝以这种伊斯兰人物为行省长官，不仅从那时起永远划入了中国版图，而且至今仍然是中国回民最多的地区之一。

后来，回民在中国每一个角落都定居下来，娶妻生子，体质上逐渐与中国人混血相融，人们不易区分他们了。一两代人之后，在强大的汉文明同化之下，他们忘却了自己曾讲过的阿拉伯语、波斯语及中亚各种语言——他们不仅失去了故乡，也失去了母语，变成了一种信仰的中国人。

人们后来觉得他们令人奇怪：穿戴语言都和汉族毫无区别，却古怪得不吃猪肉。（张承志《心灵史·序》）

A glance at the occupational statistics of any country of mixed religious composition brings to light with remarkable frequency a situation which has several times provoked discussion in the Catholic press and literature, and in Catholic congresses in Germany, namely, the fact that business leaders and owners of capital, as well as the higher grades of skilled labor, and even more the higher technically and commercially trained personnel of modern enterprises, are overwhelmingly Protestant. This is true not only in cases where the difference in religion coincides with one of nationality, and thus of cultural development, as in Eastern Germany between Germans and Poles. The same thing is shown in the figures of religious affiliation almost wherever capitalism, at the time of its great expansion, has had a free hand to alter the social distribution of the population in accordance with its needs, and to determine its occupational structure. The more freedom it has had, the more clearly is the effect shown. It is true that the greater relative participation of Protestants in the ownership of capital, in management, and the upper ranks of labor in great modern industrial and commercial enterprises, may in part be explained in terms of historical circumstances, which extend far back into the past, and in which religious affiliation is not a cause of the economic conditions, but to a certain extent appears to be a result of them. Participation in the above economic functions usually involves some previous ownership of capital, and generally an expensive education; often both. These are today largely dependent on the possession of inherited wealth, or at least on a certain degree of material well being. A number of those sections of the old Empire which were most highly developed economically and most favored by natural resources and situation, in particular a majority of the wealthy towns went over to Protestantism in the sixteenth century. The results of that circumstance favor the Protestants even today in their struggle for economic existence. There arises thus the historical question: why were the districts of highest economic development at the same time particularly favorable to a revolution in the Church? The answer is by no means so simple as one might think. [Chapter I Religious Affiliation and Social Stratification, Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (清教道德与资本主义精神). 1905]

公正地说，人们对“维新”运动的支持被无端夸大了。这场运动在方兴未艾之时，确实得到了很多热心于“救亡图存”的中国人的支持，因为中国在中日甲午战争中战败，中国的士大夫阶层感受到了莫大的耻辱。然而，与古今中外所有的政治运动一样，在这场维新运动中，也仍然存在着许多不同的意见，这些分歧也引起了国民的不满。所有这些持不同意见者可以分为两派：一派由一心救国、社会经验丰富且具备出色判断力及辨别力的人组成，他们希望在中国推行近代化改革，希望中国能够进步，对于这些人来说，在西方文明中，只要是同中国现实国情并行不悖、且能使这个古老国度实现长治久安之“善治”事业的事物，他们都会尽可能采取“拿来主义”的态度，尽量使用；至于另一派，我们则可以称之为“过激派”，这个派别由那些聪明的、头脑发热的年轻人组成，这些狂热分子自称是“爱国人士”，其实他们的本质是浮躁的，他们虚荣、自私、野心勃勃，既没有治国的实践经验，又缺乏判断和辨别能力。这帮狂热的年轻人倾向于要求在中国推行彻底、全面的改革，实现快速进步，而毫不考虑在这一过程中可能会遇到的阻碍——即便那样会意味着要冒颠覆大清帝国的危险，他们也在所不惜。究其目的，他们只是为了满足自己的虚荣心和野心，他们充满无知地设想，以为通过推行这样的激进改革便可以轻而易举地使中国获得现在西方列强所掌有的财富、权力和荣耀。这就是“新党”——康有为及其党徒的真实嘴脸。让人感到讽刺的是，这些狂徒居然还能

从西方人那里得到如此之多的同情与支持。这些人之所以整天叫嚷着“维新”和“进步”，是因为他们尽管渴求、艳羡西方人的财富和权力，却又极端憎恨他们——不难理解，这种极度的憎恨正是由前面提到的渴求和艳羡本身所滋生的。因此，他们也恨皇太后陛下，因为他们认为她对列强过于温和。[辜鸿铭《吾国与吾民》对于义和团运动和欧洲文明的想法（2）]

