文献详情
Can specialization be optimal when tasks are complementary?
文献类型：期刊
通讯作者：Li, SX (reprint author), Renmin Univ China, Sch Econ, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China.
期刊名称：GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
年：2020
卷：119
页码：105-109
ISSN：0899-8256
关键词：Task assignment; Multitask; Principal-agent model; Moral hazard
所属部门：经济学院
摘要：Balmaceda (2016) shows that, under certain conditions, specialization can dominate multitasking when tasks are complementary, because specialization allows for a more flexible implementation of effort profiles than multitasking does. We show that this result is vacuously true, and multitasking always dominates specialization with task complementarity. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
DOI：10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.015
百度学术：Can specialization be optimal when tasks are complementary?
语言：外文
人气指数：1
浏览次数：1
基金：National Natural Science Foundation of ChinaNational Natural Science Foundation of China [71773131, 71922021]; Beijing municipal fund for building world-class universities (disciplines) of Renmin University of China
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