赵斌^{1, 2, 3,,},
肖创柏¹,
张问银³,
古雪¹
1.北京工业大学信息学部 ??北京 ??100124
2.济宁学院计算机科学系 ??曲阜 ??273155
3.临沂大学信息科学与工程学院 ??临沂 ??276000
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(61501008, 61771230)，北京自然科学基金(4162007)，山东省重点研发计划(2017CXGC0701)，山东省自然科学基金(ZR2013FQ024)，山东省高等学校科技计划项目(J17KA048)

详细信息

作者简介:赵斌：男，1979年生，博士，教授，硕士生导师，主要研究方向为网络安全、云计算
肖创柏：男，1962年生，博士，教授，博士生导师，主要研究方向为数字信号处理、计算机网络技术
张问银：男，1972年生，博士，教授，硕士生导师，主要研究方向为信息安全、区块链技术
古雪：女，1996年生，硕士生，研究方向为信息安全

通讯作者:赵斌　jnzhaobin@163.com

中图分类号:TP301

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被引次数:0

出版历程

收稿日期:2018-04-28
修回日期:2018-12-18
网络出版日期:2018-12-25
刊出日期:2019-04-01

Incentive and Restraint Mechanism of Rewards and Punishment in Access Control Based on Game Theory

Bin ZHAO^{1, 2, 3,,},
Chuangbai XIAO¹,
Wenyin ZHANG³,
Xue GU¹
1. Faculty of Information Technology, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing 100124, China
2. Department of Computer Science, Jining University, Qufu 273155, China
3. College of Information Science and Engineering, Linyi University, Linyi 276000, China
Funds:The Nation Science Foundation of China (61501008, 61771230), The Natural Science Foundation of Beijing (4162007), The Shandong Provincial Key Research and Development Program (2017CXGC0701), The Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province (ZR2013FQ024), The Project of Shandong Province Higher Educational Science and Technology Program (J17KA048)


摘要
摘要:基于信任的访问控制问题是面向开放式网络访问控制中研究的热点。该文针对开放式网络环境下网络交互实体不诚信合作的交互访问行为，建立了基于信任的动态访问控制博弈模型，并通过设计的奖惩激励约束机制促使交互实体在自身利益驱动下理性选择系统(设计者)期望的策略，以利益作为驱动力，奖励诚信节点，惩罚约束激励不诚信节点，实现符合目标要求实体间的总体均衡状态。仿真实验和结果分析表明，在网络交互实体的不诚信访问问题上该激励约束机制是有效的。
关键词:开放式网络/
博弈理论/
访问控制/
激励/
约束机制
Abstract:Trust based access control is a research hotspot in open network that access control is one of the importation technology of information security. For the interactive access behaviors of non-honest cooperation between network interactive entities in open network, the dynamic game access control model is established based on trust, and interactive entities are encouraged to rationally choose strategies expected by the system (the designer) driven by its own benefits through the designed mechanism. Taking benefits as the driven force, the mechanism rewards the honest nodes and punishes and restrains the non-honest nodes, and then reaches the general state of equalization between entities which meets the goal. The simulation experiment and result analysis show that the incentive and restraint mechanism is valid and necessary on the issue of non-honest access between network interactive entities.
Key words:Open network/
Game theory/
Access control/
Incentive/
Restraint mechanism



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