论文题目：Endogenous Group Formation and Monitoring
报告人：张琥（中央财经大学经济学院副教授）
论文摘要：In this paper, we investigate the issue of endogenous group formation by considering the information transmission efficiency. With three examples, we show that the optimal group structure should minimize the distortion induced by information imperfection. By peer monitoring with joint liability, players would have incentive to disclose miscreant actions they observed. As a result, private information is transformed into public information which helps forming efficient equilibrium.
时间：5月30日（周四）中午12:10-13:30
地点：学院南路校区学术会堂712
报告人简介：张琥，中央财经大学经济学院副教授，毕业于北京大学光华管理学院，主要从事博弈论、产业经济学、企业理论方面的研究。在《经济研究》等期刊发表经济论文十余篇。
主办：中国经济与管理研究院
[编辑]：张萌